Epistolica dissertatio de principiis iusti, et decori, continens apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei, De cive. Amsterdam, Lowijs Elzevier, 1651 [bound with:]. [EIUSDEM]. Disputatio de finito & infinito, in qua defenditur sententia clarissimi Cartesii, de motu, spatio, & corpore

Autore: VELTHUYSEN, Lambert van (1622-1685)

Tipografo: Lowijs Elzevier

Dati tipografici: Amsterdam, 1651


THE RECEPTION OF HOBBES AND DESCARTES IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE MID-17TH CENTURY

Two works in one volume, 12mo (132x75 mm). [16], 269, [3] pp. Collation: *8 A-L12 M4; [8], 80 pp. Collation: *4 A-C12 D4. Printer's device on the title pages. 18th-century calf gilt, lettering piece on spine, marbled edges and flyleaves (slightly stained and rubbed, joints partly repaired). Tiny stamp on the first title page (an initial L inscribed in a triangle). Very light occasional foxing. A very good, genuine copy.

Rare first edition of these two works by the Dutch philosopher and theologian Lambert van Velthuysen, which were published separately but are often found together, not only because they were printed by the same printer in the same year, but also because they complement each other in bringing together the ideas of Hobbes and Descartes and helping to disseminate them in the Netherlands. Both works were included in Van Velthuysen's Opera omnia, published in 1680, but with substantially revised texts. The Epistolica dissertatio was also published in 1706 in an anonymous English translation.

“[…] philosophy penetrated more deeply into Dutch society than probably anywhere else in Europe, and the new philosophies were often developed and transformed in ways of which their authors would never have conceived. Thus, even if the two most important and influential philosophers in the Netherlands were Descartes and Hobbes, one cannot ignore the many Dutch philosophers who to a great extent created the context in which these men were read. One of the most important, and the most prolific, of these men was Lambert van Velthuysen, and the Letter [on the principles of justness and decency, containing a Defence of the Treatise De cive of the learned Mr. Hobbes] is his most original and interesting contribution. Indeed, the interest of the Letter extends far beyond the purely philosophical, the text being to a considerable extent autobiographical in nature. It tells us much about the preocupations of a member of Utrecht's ruling class, and Van Velthuysen's desire to rationalize the minutest parts of his life provides us with insights into his most private feelings, making this as valuable a text for the study of Dutch seventeenth-century culture as it is for philosophy. A central preocupation of the Letter is the justness for a Christian of inflicting punishments, a question to which Van Velthuysen repeatedly returned. His main justification for it is the maintenance of social order, another central theme of the Letter along with that of maintaining one's place within the social order and the dignity and respect that go with it, all governed by the classical notion of decorum. But he seems to have discovered a basic foundation for such arguments in the Hobbesian principle of self-preservation, and like Hobbes he uses it to reformulate classical and medieval natural law theories […] For Van Velthuysen, as for Hobbes, man was primarily driven by the instinct for self-preservation, and he formed socities not for mutual benefit but for his own well-being. From this principle, it was claimed, it was possible to derive all of natural law and thus the basis of morality. Unlike Hobbes, however, Van Velthuysen derives the entire foundation of natural law from first principles. The social order is superimposed upon a world order instituted by God that is directed towards the particular end that God had in mind when creating the universe, what is nowadays usually referred to as Intelligent Design and which was used to justify so much of the new philosophy and science of the seventeenth century. In the present case, it is the source of a natural revelation that shows us how we ought to behave, and the lesson it teaches us is that we have such a strong desire for self-preservation that it is God's will that we do everything in our power to maintain our well-being. Self-preservation is thus transformed from a basic right, which we are free to exercise, into the fundamental law of nature that is, in a sense, God's commandment. This is the unifying principle of the work by means of which Van Velthuysen works out his entire moral philosophy. On the way, we are given insights into his views on sex and drugs, marriage and divorce, his duties as a physician, and general deportment that are frequently somewhat naïve in their candour […]

[T]he Epistolica dissertatio exists in two different versions: the first edition of 1651, published anonymously as an individual treatise, and the second, amended edition produced for Van Velthuysen's Opera omnia of 1680 […] The 1680 edition, for obvious reasons, can be viewed as the definitive version of the work, the changes that were made reflecting the development of Van Velthuysen's thought during the intervening thirty years […] Conversely, the 1651 edition has the merit of being the original version of the work, written in answer to questions that were pressing at the time rather than to fit into a volume of collected works. In addition, as has already been stated, much of the interest of the text stems from the fact that it not only presents Van Velthuysen's ideas but is also an important landmark in the Dutch reception of Hobbes, and specifically of De Cive, a process that was at its height in the late 164os and early 165os. The first edition fully belongs to this process and presents an undiluted response to Hobbes's political thought, for the most part favourable. The reception of Hobbes in the Netherlands was in turn conditioned by the reaction to new philosophies in general and to Descartes in particular, and the 1651 edition of the Epistolica dissertatio represents one of the first publications by a philosopher who was favourably inclined towards Cartesianism, even if the work can only be called Cartesian in a very limited sense. On balance, therefore, the 1651 edition appears altogether more interesting from an historical perspective. Furthermore, the 1651 edition also contains the lengthy Probatio ex scriptura sacra [pp. 213-269], representing about one fifth of the entire text, that was totally suppressed in 1680, presumably because it would have had to have been entirely rewritten” (M. de Mowbray, Translator's preface, in: L. Velthuysen, “A Letter on the principles of justness and decency, containing a Defence of the Treatise De cive of the learned Mr. Hobbes”, Leiden, 2013, pp. XI-XIII and XVI-XVII).

“Lambert van Velthuysen's Epistolica dissertatio de principis Justi et Decori, continens apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei, De Cive, published anonymously in 1651, marked a decisive moment in the English philosopher's influence in the Netherlands: for the first time, the text recommended adopting an openly favourable position with regard to Hobbes's thought […] Van Velthuysen nevertheless had a genuine interest in De Cive and Cartesian philosophy, which meant that his commitment was destined to open up a new philosophical perspective: one that brought Cartesianism and politics closer together by applying the theory of passions to the definition of the best government. Spinoza, a major figure, also joined that trend, as did republican authors such as the brothers Johan and Pieter de la Court […] The ‘Dissertation in the form of a letter', written in support of De Cive, was among the first titles that Van Velthuysen published. In this he announced his intention to defend Hobbes's ‘principles' and stated that he fully subscribed to his ‘moral doctrine'. Such an undertaking was not lacking in boldness, as Van Velthuysen was well aware, taking the opportunity to praise intellectual courage at the same time: ‘Who ever attempted a great and memorable deed without risk?' (p. 66). Above all, he seems to have been one of those best placed -on account of his education, his position and his friendships- to provide a Dutch perspective on certain aspects of Hobbesian philosophy. His ties with Spinoza, even though they subsequently loosened, linked him with the enlightened milieu of Spinoza's ‘circle': in addition, whereas the Aristotelian tradition, in the academic world, still retained an idea of politics that was far removed from the actual situation in the Netherlands at the time, Van Velthuysen -in his functions as an alderman, a representative of civil power to consistories, and a doctor- found himself directly confronted with the pratical, specific problems of civilian life. The Epistolica dissertatio, therefore, is an instance of a reception that was determined by several factors. At the same time, it qualifies as reception in the form of active appropriation. Rather than just faithfully transmitting an idea or presenting a system, Van Velthuysen's ‘apology' goes much further. In particular, it directly applies a principle borrowed from Hobbes -that of self-preservation- to current events. To use some of the terms used in a letter from Etienne de Courcelles to Van Velthuysen shortly before the Epistolica dissertatio was published, Van Velthuysen's work does not merely consist in ‘following in the footsteps' of the author he defends, but ‘in building on the foundations laid by Hobbes and successfully completing those that remain unfinished' […] The fact that Van Velthuysen was born in Utrecht placed him at the crossroads of the newest philosophical questions and the most radical Reformed orthodoxy. Utrecht university was the first, in the Netherlands as elsewhere, to teach Cartesian ideas […] Van Velthuysen belonged to the second generation of Descartes' disciples. He was the one who deliberately spread the discussion of Cartesianism beyond the university. In the first instance, he addressed a learned audience with his Latin treatise ‘A Disputation on the finite and the infinite', published in 1651 and written in defence of the Cartesian theories of movement, space and bodies. In his own way, he distinguished the physical and mathematical infinite from the divine infinite and, like Descartes, reached the conclusion that the theological and philosophical spheres were separate. In 1655, however, he published a series of pamphlets in Dutch in defence of Copernicanism […] [in which when] comes the question of the movement of the Earth, […] Van Velthuysen reaffirms the principal rules for interpreting Scripture that he had already presented in 1651 in the Epistolica dissertatio. In order to show that the new physics did not contradict the teaching of Scripture, he gives a few simple, precise rules for interpreting sacred texts. While the Bible's authority is absolute, it is the meaning and not the letter that is authoritative. When interpreting it, all the circumstances in which it was written (historical, stylistic, linguistic, etc.) must be taken into account. In the long ‘Proof from Holy Scripture' published as an annexe to the first edition of the Epistolica dissertatio [pp. 213-269], Van Velthuysen provides several examples in which this method is applied […] Van Velthuysen's conception of the interpretation of Holy Scripture placed him within the trend of Protestant rational exegesis, which tends to see the Bible as an historical text to which one should apply a philological approach comparable to that used by humanists on ancient texts […] Van Velthuysen's commitment to Cartesianism was, therefore, concurrent with his interest in Hobbes's thought. That remarkable concurrence reflected a movement that brought these two philosophies together under the same thought system, whether to criticize them or adhere to them. On the one hand, the Hobbesian ‘danger' could be compared with the danger that Cartesian philosophy represented, while, on the other hand, the first disciples of Hobbes found they were also the staunchest Cartesians -for example, the De la Court brothers and Spinoza. From his very first works, Van Velthuysen, a pioneer of ‘political Cartesianism', launched himself wholeheartedly into two of the major philosophical battles of the century -those around Descartes and Hobbes- and, in doing so, demonstrated those very qualities he had advocated at the beginning of the Epistolica dissertatio […] Despite being well aware that he would be subjected to violent criticism, he was nevertheless undaunted by the manner in which his text might be received […] It is true that he submitted his manuscript to Etienne de Courcelles at the same time as that of the Disputatio de Finito et Infinito; de Courcelles approved of his analysis of Hobbes and encouraged him not to allow his critics to distract him, which was certainly a source of strength for him. Nevertheless, the enterprise carried a certain amount of risk, yet Van Velthuysen did not shy away from that […]

The Epistolica dissertatio is presented as a letter addressed to an anonymous correspondent, whom Van Velthuysen describes as an ‘uncommonly learned philosopher, a man to whom I was most eager to recommend myself', but with whom -hence the reason for the letter- he is in disagreement: he ‘disagreed with me on certain points' (p. 57). Who might this correspondent be? […] one possibility is that it could be Descartes […] However, there is no concrete evidence to support this theory […] In terms of political ideas, the author of the Epistolica dissertatio was not an unreserved supporter of Hobbes. He was a long way from espousing all the ideas of Hobbes, whom he had nevertheless recommended, and seems somewhat caught between two worlds: the world of the traditional system of the monarchomachs, and the world of modern absolutism. Although the Epistolica dissertatio devotes a great deal of space to the question of magistrates -which seems to be the main objective of this discourse- it only deals with it from a particular angle: the right to punish. From Hobbes to Van Velthuysen, the perspectives remain very different. First of all, while the idea of a state of war is not absent from the Epistolica dissertatio, it is not the result of an anthropological definition of man, as was the case with Hobbes, but rather stems from a theological conception in which the nature of man is determined by the Fall. For Van Velthuysen, human history begins with the sin of Adam and Eve, and not with a war of all against all. Consequently, it is the very idea of an original sin that justifies the political institution, and it is the principle of self-preservation that stands as a basis […] The political state is part of the divine plan and belongs to the reordering of nature after original sin. It then derives from the principle of self-preservation […] He categorically excludes the need for a complete transfer of the rights of individuals to the sovereign, and supports the existence of a contract between the people and the sovereign in order to safeguard the subjects' right to resistance in the event of tyranny […] The Epistolica dissertatio takes great care to define the rules of a free society by setting out two opposing influences: that of Calvinist thought, with Beza and Junius Brutus -the theorization of a subject's to resist the monarch to its highest level-, and that of Hobbes, who entrusted political omnipotence with the task of guaranteeing civil piece. Although this attept does not achieve the systematic character of a true theory, it nevertheless has the great merit of introducing what is known as Cartesian politics […]” (C. Secretan, Introduction, in: L. Velthuysen, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 8-13, 17, and 31-36).

First discussed mainly at the University of Utrecht in the 1640s, Dutch Cartesianism took the form of an academic philosophy only in the 1650s at the University of Leiden, where Cartesian ideas were first introduced by A. Heereboord (1614-1659) and where they soon collided or mixed with Hobbes's philosophy, which was also rapidly gaining ground. The Cartesian philosopher Johannes “De Raey may also have been reacting to Van Velthuysen, who published a defence of Hobbes's De cive and provided a combination of Descartes's and Hobbes's philosophy in the disputation De finito et infinito as well as ‘political' Hobbesians such as the De la Court brothers and Abraham van Berkel (the translator of Leviathan into Dutch), as he would note, in his Cogitata [de interpretatione, 1692], the ‘replacement' of meaning in words such as good or bad, such that what is good by nature is replaced with a conventional good, as it is defined in Hobbes Leviathan and De cive. The dissemination of Hobbes's thought may explain, in part, the development of foundationalism by De Raey, as he would counter the erosion of Descartes's metaphysics - and the application of philosophy to politics” (A. Strazzoni, Dutch Cartesianism and the birth of philosophy of science: from Regius to ‘s Gravesande, Berlin-Boston, 2019, pp. 109-110).

Little is known about Van Velthuysen's life. Born into a patrician family in Utrecht in 1622, he studied theology in Geneva and Utrecht and graduated in philosophy from the University of Utrecht in 1644. In 1647 he enrolled as a medical student at the University of Leiden. After graduating in 1650, he settled permanently in Utrecht as a doctor. Like other Cartesians from Utrecht (F. Burman, J.G. Graevius, L. Wolzogen), he was a member of the “College der Savanten”, a kind of academy that met weekly to discuss new books and ideas. In 1665 Van Velthuysen became governor of the West India Company and in 1667 alderman of Utrecht. From 1669 he had the role of ‘political commissioner' to the consistory of the Church of Utrecht. He died in Utrecht in 1685 (cf. Secretan, op. cit., pp. 6-8).

“During the 1650s and 60s, Lambert van Velthuysen (1622-85) was regarded by his contemporaries as a radical author, ready to embrace the two major new philosophies, namely those of Descartes and Hobbes, and in the view of Voetians. What made him a particularly dangerous representative of the novatores was his willingness to present these novelties not only in Latin, but also in Dutch. The fact is, however, that by the end of the 1660s Van Velthuysen, instead of representing the most radical wing of Dutch Cartesianism, decided to attack both Lodewijk Meyer and Spinoza, since he felt these authors were indeed subversive in the way in which they turned Cartesianism into an essentially atheist and materialist philosophy that threatened to undermine the very basis of Christian society. But after having accused Spinoza, in a brief but exciting exchange of letters that took place in 1671, of teaching sheer atheism , the two seem to have become quite friendly” (W. Van Bunge, H. Krop, B. Leeuwenburgh, and P. Schuurman, eds., Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers, Bristol, 2003, s.v.).

See also C.L. Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands Cartesianisme, Utrecht, 1989, pp. 35-38; A. Del Prete, Lire la Bible en cartésien: Lambert van Velthuysen et le mouvement de la Terre, in: “Chemins du cartésianisme”, A. Del Prete & R. Carbone, eds., Paris 2017, pp. 19-34; and A. Del Prete, Fluttuazioni cartesiane:Van Velthuysen e Spinoza, in: “Cartesianismi, scetticismi, filosofia moderna. Studi per Carlo Borghero”, L. Bianchi, A. Del Prete & G. Paganini, eds., Florence, 2019, pp. 141-158.

A. Willems, Les Elzevier, Nieuwkoop, 1974, pp. 282-283, no. 1126; Italian Union Catalogue, IT\ICCU\TO0E\009583 and IT\ICCU\BVEE\034675.


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